Security Guide #

This security guide provides developers and embedders with information on the security model and features of GraalVM, such that they can build a secure application on top of it. It assumes that readers are familiar with the GraalVM architecture. This guide does not replace but rather supplements the Java security documentation with aspects unique to GraalVM. It also provides security researchers with information on GraalVM’s security model.

All security assumptions only apply to the enterprise version of GraalVM.

This guide does not (yet) cover security aspects specific to a language implementation, usage of the Instrument API or any APIs other than the Polyglot API.

Security Model #

GraalVM is a shared runtime. It accepts instructions in a higher-level programming language (or an intermediate representation thereof) as input, which is executed at some point. Developers that implement security controls for their applications (such as access control) in code that is being run by GraalVM can rely on the correct execution of instructions. Incorrect execution of security-critical code running on top of GraalVM that allows to bypass such a security control is regarded a security vulnerability.

Using the Truffle Language Implementation framework, interpreters for guest languages can be implemented to execute guest applications written in languages such as Javascript, Python, Ruby, R or WebAssembly (Wasm) on top of GraalVM. The execution context for these guest applications can be created with restricted privileges, to allow for the execution of less trusted guest applications. For example, an embedder writes an application server (the host application) that runs JavaScript guest applications from a less trusted source. GraalVM offers features to limit the privileges of the guest application to some extent.

These restrictions are currently only supported in Javascript and managed LLVM. Ruby, R, Python, WASM are experimental and not recommended for production use at this time.

For every guest language shipped with GraalVM, a launcher, e.g., interactive shell, is provided. These launchers behave in the same way and come with the same security guarantees as their “original” counterparts.

We appreciate reports of bugs that break the security model via the process outlined in the Reporting Vulnerabilities guide.

Guest Application Context #

GraalVM allows a host application written in a JVM-based language to create an execution context to run code written in one or multiple guest language(s). When creating a context, the host application can control which resources the guest can access. By default access to all managed resources is denied and needs to be granted explicitly.

File I/O #

Access to files can be controlled via two means. The allowIO privilege grants the guest application unrestricted access to the host file system:

Context context = Context.newBuilder().allowIO(true).build();

Alternatively the Truffle framework virtual file system that all guest file I/O will be routed through can be installed:

Context context = Context.newBuilder().fileSystem(FileSystem fs).build();

Threading #

A guest application can only create new threads, if the context is created with the corresponding privilege:

Context context = Context.newBuilder().allowCreateThread(true).build()

Native Access #

The Truffle framework native interface allows access to privileged native code. It needs to be granted to a guest application context via:

Context context = Context.newBuilder().allowNativeAccess(true).build()

Host Interoperability #

GraalVM allows exchanging objects between the host and the guest application. Since the guest application is potentially less trusted than the host application, multiple controls exist to tune the degree of interoperability between the guest and the host:

  • allowHostAccess(policy) – configures which public constructors, methods or fields of public classes of the host can be accessed by the guest
  • allowHostClassLookup(Predicate<String> classFilter) – allows the guest application to look up the host application classes specified in the classFilter via Java.type. For example, a Javascript context can create a Java ArrayList, provided that ArrayList is whitelisted by the classFilter and access is permitted by the host access policy: context.eval("js", "var array = Java.type('java.util.ArrayList')")
  • allowHostClassLoading(true/false) - allows the guest application to access the host’s class loader to load new classes. Classes are only accessible if access to them is granted by the host access policy.

The host access policy has three different options:

  • ALL - all public constructors, methods or fields of public classes of the host can be accessed by the guest. Note that this exposes all host functionality to the guest, effectively disabling any security boundary between host and guest.
  • NONE - no constructors, methods or fields of the host can be accessed by the guest.
  • EXPLICIT - only public constructors, methods and fields of public classes that are annotated with @HostAccess.Export can be accessed by the guest.

The following example demonstrates how these configuration options work together:

 public class MyClass {
     public int accessibleMethod() {
         return 42;

     public static void main(String[] args) {
         try (Context context = Context.newBuilder() //
                         .allowHostClassLookup(c -> c.equals("myPackage.MyClass")) //
                         .build()) {
             int result = context.eval("js", "" +
                             "var MyClass = Java.type('myPackage.MyClass');" +
                             "new MyClass().accessibleMethod()").asInt();
             assert result == 42;

This Java/JavaScript example

  • creates a new context with the permission to look up the class myPackage.MyClass in the guest application evaluates a JavaScript code snippet that accesses the Java class myPackage.MyClass using the Java.type builtin provided by the JavaScript language implementation
  • creates a new instance of the Java class MyClass by using the JavaScript new keyword
  • calls the method accessibleMethod() which returns “42”. The method is accessible to the guest language because because the enclosing class and the declared method are public, as well as annotated with the @HostAccess.Export annotation.

The guest can also pass objects back to the host. This is implemented by functions that return a value. For example,

Value a = Context.create().eval("js", "21 + 21");

returns a guest object representing the value “42”. When executing less trusted guest code, application developers need to take care when processing objects returned from the guest application – the host application should treat them as less trusted input and sanitize accordingly.

Managed Execution of LLVM IR #

The Truffle framework also supports the LLVM intermediate representation (IR) as a guest language. Several native system programming languages, above all C/C++, can be compiled to LLVM IR with the LLVM compiler toolchain. Typically, these languages are not memory safe by themselves and violations of memory safety being a frequent cause for security vulnerabilities.

The GraalVM Enterprise Edition adds support for a managed execution mode for LLVM IR code. In managed mode, all ties to the native level are abstracted and routed through GraalVM. In particular this means that:

  • Temporal and spatial memory safety. Memory is allocated from the Java heap. This means that memory allocations are managed objects and all accesses are performed in a memory-safe manner (no arbitrary pointer arithmetics, no unchecked out-of-bounds accesses).
  • Type safety. It is not possible to reinterpret a data pointer into a function pointer and execute arbitrary instructions (since these are distinct pointer types for LLVM Runtime).
  • System calls are intercepted and routed to the corresponding Truffle framework APIs. For example, file IO is mapped to the Truffle framework FileSystem API. The set of currently supported system calls is very limited – only syscalls that can safely be mapped to the Truffle API level are available. Since LLVM runtime in managed mode always runs bitcode compiled for Linux/x86, it only needs to implement system calls for this platform.
  • All dependent libraries are executed in managed mode as well, removing all references to natively executed system libraries. This includes libraries that are provided by the LLVM Runtime, such as muslibc.

Managed mode can be selected when creating a context (Context.create()) or when calling the bin/lli binary by specifying the --llvm.managed option. A “managed” context will adhere to any restrictions (e.g., allowIO) passed during context creation and does not need the allowNativeAccess privilege.

Security Caveats #

Native Image Heap #

The native image builder executes the static initializers of classes at build time and persists the state in the native image heap. This means that any information that is obtained in static initializers becomes part of the native image executable. This can lead to unintentionally including properties of the build environment, such as environment variables in the image heap.

Developers can request static initializers to be re-run at runtime by either specifying the --initialize-at-run-time CLI parameter when building a native image, or making use of the RuntimeClassInitialization API.

Sharing Execution Engines #

Application developers may choose to share execution engines among execution contexts for performance reasons. While the context holds the state of the executed code, the engine holds the code itself. Sharing of an execution engine among multiple contexts needs to be set up explicitly and can increase performance in scenarios where a number of contexts execute the same code. In scenarios where contexts that share an execution engine for common code also execute sensitive (i.e., private) code, the corresponding source objects can opt out from code sharing with:


ScriptEngine Compatibility #

For reasons of backward compatibility, certain guest languages also support Java’s ScriptEngine interface. For example, this allows GraalVM JavaScript to be used as a drop-in replacement for Nashorn. However, to maintain compatibility, the Nashorn GraalVM JavaScript ScriptEngine interface will create a context with all privileges granted to the script and should be used with extreme caution and only for trusted code.

Security Manager and Untrusted Code #

The OpenJDK vulnerability group strongly discourages to running untrusted code under a security manager. This also applies to GraalVM, which does not support untrusted code execution in Java – GraalVM Native Image does not support a security manager in general. While GraalVM’s ability to restrict the execution of guest languages (languages implemented with Truffle framework) applications to a certain extent is not dependent on a security manager, it is also not suited to be used as a sandbox for running untrusted code.

If untrusted and potentially malicious code is to be executed, we recommend GraalVM customers who have an immediate requirement to execute untrusted and potentially adversarial code, adopt the appropriate isolation primitives to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of their application data.

GraalVM Enterprise to GraalVM Community Downgrade #

GraalVM’s managed execution of native code is only available in GraalVM Enterprise. When downgrading to GraalVM Community, native code execution is only available with the allowNativeAccess privilege. This also applies to languages implemented with Truffle framework that allow for native code extensions, such as Python and Ruby.